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Abstract: From the analytical point of view of Hegel's philosophical 
anthropology, in Kojève's interpretation, work is an existential structure 
through which the dual process of subjectification and socialization 
unfolds. For Hegel, however, this process is not taken for granted: its 
possibility is understood in terms of the culmination of man's conquest of 
humanity, taking as a point of departure the relation of mastery to 
servitude and the undertaking to transform this relation precisely from 
within the perspective of servitude. The goal of this article is to 
reconstruct the conceptual framework of this philosophical moment, to 
our mind an indispensible precondition for the apperception of our 
modern societies' functioning at the most fundamental level, to the extent 
that they consider themselves to be ‘work based societies.’ 
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Introduction:  The philosophical anthropology of Hegel at the heart 
of the modern experience of work 
 
In his inaugural class at the Collège de France, and in the midst of a period in social 
science clearly dominated by the structuralist paradigm, Michel Foucault reminds us 
of Hegel's still considerable place in western thought:   
 
Our entire epoch, whether in logic or epistemology, whether through Marx or 
Nietzsche, is trying to escape from Hegel... Yet to make a real escape from Hegel 
presupposes an exact appreciation of what it costs to detach ourselves from him. It 
presupposes a knowledge of how close Hegel has come to us, perhaps insidiously. It 
presupposes a knowledge of what is still Hegelian in that which allows us to oppose 
Hegel, and an ability to gauge how much our resources against him are perhaps still a 
ruse which he is using against us, and at the end of which he is waiting for us, 
immobile and elsewhere. (Foucault 1971, pp. 74-75, our translation) 
 
 
In this article, we would like to illustrate the profundity of this judgment when 
considering the role of work with respect to the human condition in general, and to the 
condition of modern human beings in particular. Our initial hypothesis is that the 
French philosopher Alexandre Kojève best understood this dimension of Hegel's work, 
making it the cornerstone of his entire interpretation (Kojève 1947). [1] 
 
It is not here a question of proposing a systematic evaluation and an exhaustive 
examination of Kojève's interpretation of Hegel. Instead, we intend to approach it 
from a precise angle, the epistemological problem of the status of this interpretation as 
an interpretation. If it is only an interpretation firmly rooted in the heart of what it is 
interpreting, seeking to extend it by clarifying it, how exactly does it contribute to the 
greater or improved comprehension of our experience of work? If it goes beyond what it 
is interpreting, how and to what degree does it modify this understanding? 
 
We will attempt to resolve this question in the conclusion. But first it is important to 
specify the manner in which we will explain Kojève's reading of Hegel. [2] In our 
view, Kojève only envisaged Hegel's philosophy from the perspective of general 
anthropology, that is—to use phenomenological vocabulary—from the viewpoint of the 
analysis of basic existential structures fundamental to the human condition. From this 
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perspective, Hegel can easily communicate with the social sciences of work (economics, 
sociology, social psychology, labour law, etc…), which were flourishing when Kojève 
was developing his interpretation of Hegel. Yet this point of view neglects the logical, 
ontological and metaphysical developments also present in Hegel's work and which 
constitute the core of other major contemporary interpretations of this work. 
 
The anthropological reading of Hegel is essentially a retrospective construction whose 
principle advocates are Marx, followed by Kojève. In The 1844 Manuscripts, Marx 
situates the ‘greatness of the Phenomenology’  in the fashion in which Hegel ‘[…] 
grasps the essence of labour, and conceives of objective man, true man because real 
man, as the result of his own labour’ (p. 202). Thus, in the famous figures of master 
and servant, he locates the codetermination of the generic essence of human work, on 
one hand, and the historical process of the humanization of nature, on the other. 
Taking this logic further, Kojève (1947) radicalizes the anthropological interpretation 
of Hegel by developing a theory of historical man understood essentially as a negating 
subject, [3] exercising his negativity conjointly through the existential forms of 
struggle and work. For Kojève reading Hegel, it is  
 
(the) transformation of nature in view of a non-material idea, work in the most 
fundamental sense of the term, work in which a non-natural world is created, one 
which is technical, humanised, adapted to the human Desire of a being which has 
demonstrated and realized its superiority over Nature in risking his life for the non-
biological goal of Recognition. (Kojève 1947, p. 147).  
 
It is on the basis of this anthropological perspective that we would like to highlight  
the salient features of Hegel's philosophy of work without, however, focusing 
exclusively on the Phenomenology of Spirit's ‘Domination and Servitude,’ as is 
basically the case in Kojève's text. For us, it is a matter of showing the scope of 
Kojève's interpretation, and not of indicating its limitations. Inquiries into the 
dimension of work are also to be found in the earlier texts of the Jena period (the 
System of Ethical Life and Philosophy of Spirit) and, of course, also in the 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences and in the Principles of the Philosophy of 
Right. We aim to unite this somewhat disparate corpus in pursuing the objective link 
which it suggests between the activity of work and the problem of inter-subjective 
recognition. In effect, Hegel brings to conceptual clarity the two-sided character of the 
universal dimension of work in modern society, in which each individual gains 
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consciousness of himself, to the extent that he achieves recognition as an integral 
member of a human community. To use more sociological terminology, we could say 
that the Hegelian notion of work finds its most essential role in both the constitution 
of individual identities and the nature of the social link between human communities.  
  
Our contribution intends to take account of Kojève's interpretation of Hegel in as 
much as it is essentially a philosophy of labour. The question of the relevance of this 
philosophy for our modern era is obviously important, but it cannot be examined here. 
Let us simply remember that in drawing upon and extending Kojève's framework, and 
in considering the social philosophy of Hegel, the social theoretician Axel Honneth 
(1995) brings out this aspect in exemplary fashion. The classical political philosophy 
which preceded Hegel was exclusively based on the anthropology of the self-interested 
individual. As a result, it was incapable of considering the human community except 
in the abstract and instrumental mode of associated individuals. From this viewpoint, 
the political contract (with the state as the instrument ensuring its permanence) 
becomes the sole means of putting an end to the incessant war of all against all. On the 
contrary, as Axel emphasises, a reconciled society should essentially be conceived as a 
community through which the ethical integration of free citizens is realized, one in 
which a dynamic unity of universal and individual liberty prevails. Against all 
instrumentalist reductionism, public life cannot be considered as the result of the 
mutual restriction of the spaces of private spheres of liberty, but rather the other way 
round, namely as the opportunity for the fulfilment of every single individual's 
freedom. [4] Yet while Honneth may have underlined the centrality of recognition, his 
understanding of it, expressed in the most operatory terms of modern social psychology, 
does not seem to have sufficiently insisted on the singular place of work at the heart of 
the idea of recognition for Hegel. The stakes involved in rectifying this oversight are 
high: to render explicit this aspect of Hegel's philosophy is also, in our view, to arrive 
at the heart of the modern experience of work, at a time, indeed, in which there are 
those who speak of the ‘end’ or ‘crisis’ of work. [5]  
  
To be clear, the objective of this study is not a historical analysis of the socio-political 
dimension of our modern experience of work; instead, it is to outline the conditions of 
the possibility of such an experience, via the interpretation of Hegel by Kojève. 
Formulated in contemporary terminology, the main idea is the following. From the 
analytical point of view of this philosophical anthropology, work is an existential 
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structure through which the two-sided process of subjectification and socialization 
unfolds. However, this process is not taken for granted: its possibility is understood in 
terms of the culmination of the conquest of the humanity of man, taking as its point of 
departure the relation of mastery to servitude and the undertaking to transform this 
relation precisely from within the perspective of servitude. We aim to reconstruct the 
conceptual framework of this philosophical moment, which we consider an 
indispensible precondition for the apperception of the functioning of our modern 
societies at their most fundamental level, to the extent that they consider themselves to 
be ‘work based societies.’ 
 
 
Struggle and work as competing existential attitudes 
 
Let us begin by observing that the question of work in Hegel is subject to diverse 
treatment. The challenge is to establish coherence between the exploration of the 
master-slave dialectic (Phenomenology) and the elaboration of the system of needs in 
civil society (Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences). How can we make the 
transition from servitude to an idle master, on behalf of the servant who masters 
nature, to civil society where the needs of all are satisfied via the work of each 
individual? We are aware of the response developed in the Principles of the 
Philosophy of Right: the system of needs in civil society constitutes the middle term 
between the first phase, the struggle to death for recognition, and the third phase in 
which the state is conceived as the place of this reciprocal recognition. [6] We see the 
passage from the first phase to the second phase as essential to an understanding of 
Hegel's philosophy of work, in which work is conceived fundamentally in terms of the 
process of universal education. This process is in no way natural and continuous. In 
effect, it is marked by an inaugural rupture, one which sets us on the path towards the 
construction of an authentically human order. This rupture is, as we see it, 
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Struggle for recognition 
   
The analysis of human activity, [7] as presented in the Principles, is concerned with 
the development of the free will recognized within the framework of the state. The 
analysis of Chapter IV of the Phenomenology, however, preceding as it were the 
emergence of states, depicts the original figure of such activity and the elementary 
tensions which at first animate it. In 349 of the Principles, Hegel situates the struggle 
for recognition before the beginning of real history—‘before’ understood here in a 
logical sense, as a condition of possibility. For Hegel, there is an ‘initial action’ without 
which the subsequent development of human activity could not take place. This is the 
movement of the absolute abstraction of self-consciousness, in which all immediate 
being, existing in a confused state with the still simple consciousness of object, is 
extirpated from the self. This takes place so that the self may become no more than the 
pure negativity of a consciousness equal to itself. Without entering into the long 
evolution of the subject in the history of western philosophy, it would be useful, 
nevertheless, to clarify that which Hegel opposes. To put it briefly, until Hegel, 
classical rationalism had held to a passive conception of consciousness, according to 
which the latter was bound to certain laws governing its emergence and determining 
the conditions of the possibility of its functioning. [8] For Hegel, what his predecessors 
had not understood is that this consciousness, via the process of self-reflection, 
emancipates itself absolutely from its object by detaching itself from the very 
conditions of its own exercise. To be clear, Hegel does not contend that we can entirely 
escape the consciousness of the object in general. The latter, after all, is bound to the 
universal relations of the world of phenomena. Yet this is what is specifically untrue 
of self-consciousness, for which ‘work’ consists precisely in extracting itself from this 
world and discovering within itself the capacity to deny everything. There is nothing 
which escapes its relativizing gesture, neither the things of the world, nor others, nor 
indeed itself. The ability of consciousness to reflect upon itself and thereby to gain 
independence with regard to things and other consciousnesses threatening to objectify 
it represents its most fundamental attribute. With Hegel, man discovers himself 
essentially as a being in possession of initiative, an agent, and not simply a passive 
recorder or accountant of the laws of nature (including those especially of ‘human 
nature’) within which he would find the model for his own behaviour.    
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It is important to recognize the extent to which the reflection of consciousness upon 
itself takes place in the constitutive presence of the other as an essential stage in the 
process of the construction of self as pure subjectivity. Indeed, this movement of 
absolute abstraction involves a struggle, in the course of which consciousness extracts 
itself from all manner of being given as a thing amongst other things. Consciousness 
must show itself in each situation as being free from any determinate ‘being-there,’ or 
indeed, to be more precise, capable of detaching itself from it at any given moment, 
capable indeed of detaching itself from the life which holds it to the world. The goal 
for consciousness is to make known how absolutely other than all object-hood it is: in 
brief, it is to become objectively subjective through a radical negation, one which is 
incessantly repeated, of all determination. In reflecting upon itself, it realizes that it 
aims towards a unique mode of being, unprecedented within the world of the mere 
‘being-there’ of simple things. It aims, that is, towards subjective freedom, the mode of 
being which requires the recognition of the other as guarantee of its own permanence. 
[9] Only a freedom can recognize a freedom, which is to say, allow it to emerge as a 
freedom through this recognition.   
    
This project is rendered inherently problematic by the fact that consciousness of self 
has an absolute need of the other as the means of attaining itself; and yet the other is 
precisely that which it cannot master. We hereby arrive at a crossroads. One possibility 
is that consciousness takes on the role of becoming the master of the other in order to 
make it into ‘its thing.’ Accordingly, it will freely run the risk of death, since it aims to 
take hold of that which the other will risk his own life to protect, namely his 
subjective liberty. It may succeed, becoming master and living from its domination of 
the world of the other. Alternatively, it may fail, which is to say abdicate (become a 
slave), not to say die [10] or, indeed, it may choose from the start not to risk dying and, 
thus, consign itself to servitude in recognizing the freedom of the other, the master, 
without reciprocity.   
      
What is a master? From the point of view of Hegel's philosophical anthropology, the 
response is simple. The master is the one who succeeds in forcing upon the other the 
recognition of himself as possessing an inherent validity, independent of all worldly 
determination. Once he has succeeded in this endeavor, the elementary activity and 
initiation of the combat for recognition takes on two distinct aspects. On one hand, the 
master's activity becomes pure command, the immediate suppression of the thing and 
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its enjoyment. On the other hand, the slave's activity becomes obedience and work 
(strictly speaking) for the master. The victor in this struggle for recognition, the 
master, is, henceforth, the one who is capable of mediating all, the world of things as 
well as individual servants, from the sole perspective of his own desire. Henceforth, all 
is reduced to the status of an instrument for the expression of his own inherent 
meaning, of which he has just gained possession/the constitution of which he has just 
gained possession: all, that is to say, with the exception of his own being for-itself. Let 
us be clear on the nature of the master's perception: refusing to mediate his own being 
for-itself, the master is limited to immediate enjoyment. Consequently, he is cut off 
from the preparation and implementation of the means of this enjoyment. It is via this 
fundamental shift that work will progressively appear as an alternative, slower and 
more patient path towards subjective self-construction. At stake is not only the 
emergence of a form of objectifying subjectivity as an alternative to struggle, but above 
all the emergence of an inter-subjective bond at the heart of the human community 
now pacified. What the servant discovers is that the struggle for recognition is 
ultimately not a viable existential attitude. 
   
 
Servile labour or the discovery of the universal  
  
The activity of the slave for the master does not exhaust its meaning in the mere 
production of things (for the master) as distinct from the operation which first brought 
them into being. [11]   
     
Admittedly the activity of the Hegelian servant has the appearance of lacking intrinsic 
value. Its goal is outside of itself: the transformation of exteriority for the enjoyment of 
another who has nothing to do other than to negate without further process. The slave 
is the one whose own desire has been suppressed by the necessity with which he is 
confronted of exclusively satisfying the master's desire. This structures the world of the 
servant: the totality of the servant's existence, all of his particular talents, only acquire 
value from the point of view of the one who is served. For Hegel, servile labour is the 
activity which permits the master to ‘be done with the thing,’ which is to say to take 
enjoyment of it through direct negation. As the self-consciousness which the slave 
carries to the master, recognition translates into the activity which bestows upon the 
thing-like character of the transformed object the form of the master's desire. 
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Ultimately, the latter confirms for himself each time via consumption the meaning he 
had originally sought in risking death: which is to say, existence takes on value for 
him in terms of pure negation, to the exclusion of all else. Outside of the original 
struggle and its ever-recurring simulacra, the master represents no more than the 
singular desire which repeats itself brutally and incessantly without progress. In this 
sense, the master projects upon humanity an unstable existential attitude which leads 
ultimately to a collective impasse. ‘The master struggles as a man (for recognition), yet 
consumes as an animal (without working). This is the essence of his inhumanity. He 
cannot go beyond this stage because he is idle. He can die as a man, but he can only live 
as an animal.’ (Kojève 1947, p. 55) 
  
For the servant, the foreignness of himself to himself, this consumption of his work 
and as it were of himself, is to say the very least of an ambivalent character. In the 
most immediate sense, it amounts to everyday suffering. However, to be glimpsed 
within the latter, this usage of self for other is also an opportunity. Via the logic of his 
condition, the slave assumes a distance with regards to the order of the immediacy of 
desire, whereas the master remains in this order. What this means is that in being 
perpetually brought back to his obligation to act for the other, in being constantly 
confronted with the demand to better understand the other's expectations, the slave 
succeeds in perfecting himself in the study of the difference between what the master 
wants (desire) and what the servant himself does (work). As such, the servant develops 
his own work of negativity, which engenders from within itself its own virtues and 
talents. 
  
This discovery of work by the servant is well known, yet how should we interpret it? Do 
we leave the relation of mastery to servitude to the merely continuous process of 
development of the servant 's technical competence? The Hegelian issue is more 
complex than that of a simple progessivist-technicist conception of work, because the 
consciousness of self which the servant attains is ultimately merely that of an efficient 
executor of a heteronymous end. If the success of his technique permits the servant to 
take account of his power over things, to realize, thus, a certain self-consciousness, the 
principle of his action and, therefore, the orientation of the latter remains no less 
determined by the desire of the master and his satisfaction. In playing ‘devil's 
advocate,’ assuming, thus, indeed a somewhat Sadean perspective, one could also say 
that the master, by virtue of the work of the slave, develops the possibilities for 
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enjoyment all the more and progressively heightens his awareness of the nature of his 
desire; the servant, on the other hand, in his condition of servitude, loses the sense of 
what it is to desire all the more: the ultimate end of the formation of the object, 
enjoyment, recedes all the more from the slave's viewpoint. Yet given this, why does the 
slave, finally conscious of his competence and of his power, not leave the service of the 
master in order to work for his own enjoyment? Why, that is, does the slave not finish 
by becoming a master, installing himself in power? To answer this question, we would 
need to measure the degree of competence on the basis of which an end to servitude 
becomes possible. Yet even after coming to an appreciation of this degree, would we 
have really thereby authentically exited from the relation of domination to servitude? 
Would it be a desire disciplined through service that the servant would be led to 
satisfy? Or would the servant merely appropriate the content of that which contributes 
to the master's enjoyment, an enjoyment with which the slave ultimately identifies, 
having as a merely industrious technician not been able to develop and express his own 
possibilities for enjoyment? 
 
 
Work and liberation 
 
In pursuing the relation between desire and work further, it is certainly the servant's 
point of view which we will have to adopt. To this end, we must leave behind us the 
problematization of desire inherited from the master, desire in the singular, in order to 
appreciate that what ultimately emerges from the servant's activity, beyond simple 
desire, is essentially the universal will.  Above all, what Hegel highlights in the 
activity initially understood as service is the obedience to another will, the exercise in 
discipline as an experience which allows the slave, and only the slave, to disassociate 
the universal will from singular desire. 
 
 
Work and objectivity  
  
Insofar as the fulfilment of another's desire, the obedience to discipline, educates and, 
thus, transforms the essence of activity by disassociating it from its immediate sensitive 
motivations, it renders possible and viable the process of humanization through 
education into the universal. This pivotal move remains somewhat underdeveloped in 
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the Phenomenology, as well as in the Encyclopaedia and Principles. It is in the earlier 
texts from the Jena period (1803-1805), that Hegel gives it fuller attention in linking 
universality and objectivity within the framework of the notion of work, articulated 
here via a reflection on the evolution of political economy. It is this link which we 
must grasp if we are to perceive the foundation of the Hegelian conception of work 
rendered accessible by the adoption of the point of view of servitude. [12]  
  
From the Jena period onward, Hegel interprets work as that which allows 
consciousness to take on an objective character, a process which culminates in the 
product. Via the product, the reality of the individual is entrusted to the power of 
objectivity, the product constituting his very being, projected henceforth as exterior to 
self. This exterior being is only what the individual has made of it; projecting himself 
in this fashion in terms of what he can perceive and show, he reveals his independence 
in relation to all givenness, which is to say he reveals himself as an independent being. 
Being for Hegel always produces itself within the sphere of the visible. The individual 
being is always that which is there at hand, that which proposes itself, ‘produces itself,’ 
under the light of objectivity. [13] 
   
If objectivity perceives itself first of all in the product, it is all the more through the 
instrument, what Hegel calls the ‘middle term,’ that it truly binds itself to universality. 
The instrument appears as the very existence of consciousness, its real being, durable 
and effective, especially in opposition to the real and objective but still ideal being of 
the word in language. [14] ‘The instrument confers upon work the permanence of being 
there at hand by situating it within the context of objective universality. Moreover, it is 
for this reason that Hegel says paradoxically that the instrument, for all that it is a 
mere means, has more value than an end: it constitutes not only the object of the 
activity but its objectification. It constitutes the activity itself as object, which is to say 
as a means of entry for each individual into the effective condition of objectivity. 
  
The connection of work to objectivity in view of the universal is further reflected 
according to Hegel, in the necessity for work to be carried out according to a rule or 
method. An individual activity is only work insofar as it adopts a way of acting which 
consists of a succession of definite processes, one which is there for all to see, which is 
the same for all and to which we must all conform if we are to do anything. It 
represents a process which anyone can perceive and demonstrate. This universal 
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method constitutes the essence of work as objective essence. [15] Admittedly, this rule 
gives itself to the individual who submits himself to it as to something external, as to 
something which subsists on its own account, as Hegel would say ‘as inorganic nature.’ 
This external being is precisely what the individual must learn, assimilate and become, 
that with which his activity must merge in order for it to become more effective and, as 
such, be recognized. There is in work an exceeding of the horizon of the individual 
who gives to his activity, and thus to his very being, the form and reality of the 
universal. 
  
This objectivity comes into effect when work is not intrinsically oriented towards 
satisfaction (even if, de facto, this remains a possibility), which is to say the 
satisfaction of the individual, but in the first place to the needs of everyone —
universal work in view of universal need. This work is not in essence what it is for the 
individual, but from the outset what it is potentially for everyone: it goes beyond the 
particularity of the product of the individual as well as the limitations of his method; 
placed within its most authentic horizon, it embodies a reality of universal vocation. 
What opens itself here is the way towards a reciprocal recognition of subjectivities, or 
more precisely a reciprocal objectification of subjectivities. [16] 
 
 
The ambiguous conversion of the master to the universality of work 
  
Through the diverse connections between work and objectivity, the universal dimension 
which governs the emergence of the activity of work reveals itself. Therefore, it offers 
itself as a specific form of the constitution of subjectivity via objectification and, as 
such, as an alternative to struggle. It is precisely this dimension which the experience 
of the servant constitutes, insofar as he educates himself into the universal and 
constructs, thus, a humanity pacified by work. What then are we to make of the 
master? Is it a question simply of converting the latter, concerning whom we know only 
that he embodies an existential impasse, to the universality of work? 
  
The universality of needs, referred to above, does not refer necessarily to the historical 
situation of the development of the social division of labour as we encounter it in the 
outlining of the system of needs in the Principles. This aspect is already present in the 
relation of mastery to servitude and finds its most natural expression in terms of 
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philosophical anthropology. Through work, the servant not only perceives the life of 
the master; he also perceives his own life which he must conserve. In effect, we have 
here the beginnings of a community of needs: in what is produced and in the way in 
which it is produced a certain de facto compromise emerges from the outset between 
that which is desired by the master and that which is necessary for the servant's 
conservation. This initial community of needs leads, through the application of the 
means of satisfaction, to the drawing up of general solutions binding for both master 
and servant, solutions which are stripped of both the arbitrariness of the servant's 
initial desire (that which precedes servitude), and of the natural character of the 
master's will (during service). What is vital to understand is that the servant, when he 
is working for the master, works at the behest of another; and, in a certain way, one 
could say he sets an example. The emphasis here is placed not on the negation by the 
servant of his own desire, but on expanding the horizons of this desire. Going beyond 
the simple realization of the master, the slave's activity accordingly represents the 
drawing up of solutions to vital problems, both universal (de jure), and collective (de 
facto) in character. In this embryonic sense, this subjection of the servant 's egotistical 
drive marks the beginning of the true freedom of man. We have here the rudimentary 
beginnings of a process of education into the universal since it is through observing the 
conduct of the servant that the master converts himself to the universal, not thereby 
under the constraint of a servant aiming to bend the master's will to his own ends. 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that the continuous transition between a state of 
nature and civil society remains difficult to conceptualize from within the perspective 
of Hegel's philosophy. On this point, Kojève provides no additional clarifications. 
Especially opaque is the transition from the moment of domination and servitude, 
where it is essentially the desire of the master which is satisfied by the slave, even if by 
his work the servant conserves his life, to the moment of civil society and the reciprocal 
satisfaction of needs within the framework of the mutual recognition of property 
owning workers.      
 
Indeed, the servant's point of view may allow the emergence of a social solution to the 
problem of recognition, or in other words a mode of subjectification other than that 
provided by struggle. However, it is still true that the conversion to reciprocal 
recognition of all society via participation in collective work constitutes a radical 
rupture. The process of humanization which emerges through it must always be 
reinitialized; in reality, it can never be taken for granted. We shall conclude our 
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The servant distinguishes himself from the master through his work and what he 
discovers in it, bringing into being a new form of subjective freedom, or to be more 
precise a new way of relating to this freedom. The freedom which he realizes or, more 
precisely, the freedom which the servants realize together, [17] will no longer be 
recognized as subsisting in-itself as a title that we can attribute to the one or withdraw 
from the other, but as exercising itself collectively in and upon the world. In brief, it 
will be recognized as a process of liberation. The problem of the original relation to the 
other is resolved via a displacement, which is to say the collective appropriation of the 
world, creating the foundation upon which our condition and habitat rest, and 
constituting the arena within which our humanity is expressed. Henceforth, each one 
is to recognize himself and, by this very process, all others, as participants in this 
process of appropriation and expression. Man is never purely vital (in terms of a 
natural being), nor completely independent of life as the master believes who 
nevertheless ultimately allows himself to be reduced to it. What the servant discovers is 
that man transcends his given existence in and through life itself. Kojeve places a 
particular emphasis on this point in his exposition of what he calls the ‘dialectic of 
master and slave.’  
 
The master can never free himself from the world in which he lives, and if this world 
perishes, he will perish with it. Only the slave can transform the given world (under 
the yoke of the master) and not perish. Only the slave can transform the world which 
forms him and keeps him in servitude, creating a world formed by him in which he 
will be free. The slave succeeds in so doing only through the labour carried out under 
duress in service to the master. Of course, this work on its own will not liberate him. 
Yet, by transforming the world through this work, the slave transforms himself and 
creates, thus, a new set of objective conditions which allows him to recommence the 
liberating struggle for recognition which he had at the start refused through fear of 
death. (Kojève 1947, p. 34, our translation).  
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To conclude this process, we are sufficiently equipped to support our position on the 
initial problem, the status of Kojève's interpretation of Hegel. Can he be satisfied with 
simply repeating Hegel's remarks—even if  dramatically reformulating them in a 
flamboyant fashion? Definitely not. A repetition that would only allow one voice to be 
heard is clearly not viable. Kojève's voice, blending with that of Hegel, sometimes 
makes it better heard, and sometimes imbues it with his own distinctive sound.  
Overall, it is our conviction that any great philosophical interpretation is never simply 
a repetition, but always a debate in which we hear two voices, that is, precisely both a 
duo and a duel. Indeed, ‘what Hegel wanted to say’ only appears to he who himself has 
something to say, as is the case for Alexandre Kojève, whose philosophical work is 
itself very important, and distinct from that of Hegel (Aufret 1992; Pirotte 2005; and 
Filoni 2010). 
  
To settle the problem of the status of Kojève's interpretation of Hegel, it is vital that we 
not lose our footing on this slippery slope; it is precisely because it is not innocent that 
his reading is profoundly [18] enlightening! In returning to some considerations of 
social theory, we may finally dare to reformulate the core of Kojève's interpretation of 
Hegel in the following fashion. The master is only a necessary moment in the 
realization of the project of freedom via the trajectory of work, liberation henceforth 
understood as the progressive, collective, autonomous and viable construction of an 
objectively human world. In his seminal work on the division of labour, Durkheim 
places the latter beyond mere functionality, at the very heart of our moral life. He does 
this insofar as the division of labour leads to the emergence of a comprehensive system 
of rights and obligations which brings men together in peaceful and durable fashion. 
The Hegelian anthropology of work seizes and renders explicit the ethical essence of 
this process of integration which Durkheim hints at in sociological terms but fails to 
develop to a point of conceptual clarity.  
    
While certainly not immune to criticism, [19] we have no reason to believe that such 
an ethical project today constitutes any less the privileged horizon within which the 
goal of humanity is to be realized. Hegel, as reinterpreted by Kojève, established for 
future generations the definitive framework within which the exigencies of this project 
can be expressed. It is our responsibility together to re-invent for it historical and 
socio-political modalities adapted to our era. 
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Endnotes 
 
[1] Indeed, few commentators present Kojève's interpretation of Hegel as stemming 
essentially from an approach grounded in the philosophy of work. What is advanced is 
basically the philosophy of history. Kojève is presented as the contemporary thinker—
in the continuation of Hegel—of the ‘end of history.’ Please see Fukuyama (1992). 
[2] To remove any ambiguity, let us indicate that this is an article on Kojève 
interpreting Hegel as a labour philosopher, and not an article on Hegel and the 
concept of work and,of course, even less an article on the philosophy of Hegel in 
general. This stance deliberately leads us to make two choices in the management of 
our argumentation: (1) Not to draw upon any critical apparatus directly concerning 
Hegel's work, which we use here only from Kojève's perspective; in his intellectual 
biography of Kojève, Dominique Aufret (1992) shows that Kojève read Hegel directly 
in German, with no critical filter; and (2) In the body of our article, to only quote 
Kojève's text, offering here an English translation of the extracts we use.  While 
Kojève's interpretation of Hegel has given rise to some research (particularly in the 
English language (Butler 1987 or Roth 1988)), to our knowledge, no study has been 
devoted to Kojève's interpretation as basically a philosophy of labour, which we believe 
could place him in the great tradition of philosophers of labour, from Locke to André 
Gorz, by way of Marx or Simone Weil. The dominant vision is to make of Kojève a 
neo-Hegelian philosopher of history, similar to Fukuyama (1992). 
[3] With Kojève, this notion arises less from a faithful reading of the Great Logic of 
Hegel than from the Heideggerian notions of finitude and being-towards-death. ‘The 
key to deciphering the logic of Kojève,’ as Pierre Macherey (1991) puts it, ‘is 
appreciating the extent to which he succeeded in selling under the name of Hegel the 
child which Marx could have given to Heidegger.’ 
[4] Ibid., p.13 
[5] It is, in our opinion, high time that we fundamentally rethink the place of Hegel in 
these debates, if only in order to avoid following in Hegel’s footsteps without being 
aware of it, as is often the case, for example, in certain exercises in ‘sociologising.’ At 
the very least, we should accord him greater importance than that accorded by 
Dominique Méda (1995) in his work, in response to Jeremy Rifkin (1993). 
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[6] On this point, please see the renowned commentary of Eric Weil (1950; and 1956). 
[7] We shall allow a certain opacity to remain at this stage, in expectation of the 
outlining below of the characteristic features of work according to the Hegelian model. 
[8] On this point, please see the first chapters of the Phenomenology, I Sense Certainty 
II Perception, III Force and Understanding. 
[9] In order to dispel any possible ambiguity concerning the archetype of ‘the dialectic 
of master and slave’ so often presented in overly schematic form, let us note that Hegel 
does not speak so much of master and slave as of domination and servitude, and above 
all of the dependence and independence of self-consciousness. The struggle in question 
here does not necessarily imply several individuals; it may indeed involve a single 
individual in a struggle with his own duality or, as Hegel puts it, with the doubling of 
his own consciousness in its reflection upon itself. This other who in recognizing me 
guarantees my own subjective existence may certainly be exterior to me; yet he may also 
constitute an aspect of my interiority. In psychoanalytical terms, we would speak today 
of the Father, the Law or Society. Under the influence of Hegel via Kojève, and 
following the Lacanian theory of the subject, please see Elisabeth Roudinesco (1993). 
[10] This would also be to miss his goal and, as such, the paradoxical necessity emerges 
that, in order for recognition to take place, the struggle should not be pursued until its 
end, the death of the other, but should rather remain poised in the tension of this 
threat. 
[11] This is true insofar as Hegel subverts, through his notion of work, which is to say 
via the activity of the servant, the Aristotelian opposition between action and 
production: ‘since everyone who makes makes for an end, and that which is made is not 
an end in the unqualified sense (but only an end in a particular relation, and the end 
of a particular operation)-only that which is done is that; for good action is an end, 
and desire aims at this.’ (Aristotle 1962).   
[12] The Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations became known 
to Hegel upon its translation into German at the end of the eighteenth century. Within 
this text, Adam Smith determines the true essence of production and of the New World 
which it has brought into being, namely that of work. Yet the conceptual framework of 
the nascent political economy is not here subject to radical interrogation, in the sense 
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of an interrogation on the very being of work as it emerges within capitalist societies in 
universal form. 
[13] For more development on this point, please see Michel Henry (1990), in 
particular, pp. 863-906. 
[14] Let us remind ourselves once more that Hegel is not directly concerned with the 
concept of work, but with tracing the life of consciousness through an inquiry into its 
conditions of possibility. Language is the first of these conditions. Immediate 
consciousness is represented in the first place by sensitive consciousness. Yet the 
sensitive dimension is marked by an inescapable evanescence from which consciousness 
escapes only to the extent that it speaks. Language puts the word in the place of the 
evanescent sensation, the former serving to stabilize the existence of the latter. Yet even 
if empirical intuition filtered through the word acquires thereby the transparency of 
the universality which extracts it from its original obscurity, it leads ultimately only to 
a form of doubling up which in essence leaves it unchanged. It is as such that self-
perception through work represents progress. These initial remarks on consciousness 
will be later developed in the first chapters of the Phenomenology, although its 
implications for the concept of work will receive more summary treatment due to the 
priority given to the outlining of the position of servitude. 
[15] It is at this point that the definitive rupture takes place between the objective 
philosophy of work, as explored in the philosophical anthropology of Hegel, and the 
subjective philosophy of work outlined by Michel Henry in his interpretation of Marx. 
[16] We will not further develop this point, which originates from within the 
philosophy of right and, as such, formalizes that which is acquired via the philosophy 
of work. To do this, we would need to integrate within the notion of work, thus 
understood, its natural prolongation, which is to say possession. Work can be seen as 
the taking hold of nature through which the process of the objectification of 
subjectivity unfolds. Hegel conceives work as a concrete development of the essence of 
the object (whether constructed or directly drawn from being-there), distinct from the 
individual and separable from him, and this essence signifies the presence of the 
infinite will in-itself and for-itself of each individual. Therefore, the recognition by 
another of an individual as possessing free will is recognition of his possession. The 
political form which follows from this universalization is in some sense to ratify this 
process of generalized recognition of all individuals as property owners. We have no 
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problem here appreciating the difficulties involved in imagining the concrete forms of 
this recognition in a society driven by a capitalist economy; in such a society work is 
marked by the societal extension of the salaried relation as a vehicle for the economic 
domination of capital which validates itself precisely through the exploitation of work 
(Castel 2002). 
[17] This idea receives treatment, heavily under the influence of Kojève, at the hands 
of Eric Weil in Philosophie politique (Vrin), in particular the second part, ‘la société,’ 
pp. 62-128. 
[18] In the sense that it offers no partial clarification as a particular commentator 
(historian, sociologist, economist, epistemologist, or political theoretician) might do, 
but confronts that which constitutes the heart of this philosophy, what it identifies—
rightly or wrongly, that is another question—as its roots and asks that it be perceived 
and discussed at this radical level (from radix or root in Latin), in other words 
according to the question of labour. 
[19] We will limit ourselves to citing the ‘conservative’ critique of technology by 
Heidegger which sees in this perversion of work the accomplishment of the obscuring 
of the being of beings corresponding to our contemporary form of the forgetfulness of 
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